Sotheby's vs. Christie's: The Rivalry That Fixed Its Fees

Sotheby's and Christie's look like the fiercest rivals in art. On the one price every seller pays them, the two houses stopped competing for six years — by agreement.

Two wooden auction gavels side by side on a polished mahogany desk with leather-bound ledgers, a brass lamp, and folded commission papers against a dark panelled wall.
Two houses, one fee structure.

Sotheby's and Christie's look like the fiercest rivals in art. They hold their marquee sales in the same city in the same fortnight, chase the same estates and trade press releases about who took the bigger total. On the one price every seller pays them, though, the two houses stopped competing for six years — by agreement. From 1993 to 1999 their chairmen and chief executives settled the commission schedule that sellers saw, and on 5 December 2001 a New York jury convicted Sotheby's former chairman, A. Alfred Taubman, of conspiring to do it.

The fix was narrower, and sneakier, than most retellings suggest. The convictions and guilty pleas concerned the seller's commission — the cut a consignor pays to have a lot sold — not the buyer's premium that the catalogue prints for everyone to read. It ran in plain sight, as a published rate card that looked like two firms arriving at the same price on their own. And when it unravelled, the $512 million the houses paid to settle the civil suits went, by the reckoning of the economists who studied the case, mostly to the side of the hammer the fix had not hurt. This is the seller's half of the ledger; our guide to the November 2026 New York sales covers the buyer's.

At a glance

Sotheby's and Christie's side by side: origins, the people behind the fix, how each house and its executives fared, and who owns each now.
Sotheby'sChristie's
Founded11 March 1744, London, by the bookseller Samuel Baker1766, London, by James Christie; first sale December 1766
Chairman in the 1990sA. Alfred Taubman, who bought the firm in 1983 and floated it on the NYSE (ticker BID) in 1988Sir Anthony Tennant, chairman May 1993 – May 1996
Chief executive who made the dealDiana "Dede" BrooksChristopher Davidge
Published seller's scale, 1995Announced 13 April, effective 5 September; lower charges for museumsAnnounced March, effective 1 September; fixed and non-negotiable
Outcome for the houseAgreed in September 2001 to plead guilty to fixing sellers' commissions; $45 million fine over five yearsAmnesty in January 2000, conditional on cooperating with the Justice Department
Outcome for the peopleBrooks pleaded guilty (5 October 2000) and received three years' probation including six months' home detention; Taubman was convicted (5 December 2001) and sentenced to a year in prison and a $7.5 million fineTennant was indicted (2 May 2001) but never tried; he stayed in England
Civil settlement, 2001$256 million$256 million
Ownership nowTaken private by Patrick Drahi in 2019 for $3.7 billionThe Pinault family's Artémis, which bought 29.1 per cent in May 1998 and later the rest

The columns mirror each other almost to the end — same city, same scale, same meetings. They part at the verdicts: Sotheby's pleaded guilty and its former chairman went to prison, while Christie's kept its amnesty and its former chairman stayed in England.

How two London salerooms became a duopoly

An auction house earns twice on every lot. The buyer pays the hammer price plus a premium; the seller receives the hammer price minus a commission. The premium is printed in the catalogue. The commission is a private contract, which is why it can be cut to nothing, or fixed by two rivals, without a bidder in the room ever knowing. How a sale looks from the bidder's side is covered in our collector's guide to art fairs and auctions.

Sotheby's dates itself from 11 March 1744, when the bookseller Samuel Baker founded it in London; Christie's from 1766, when James Christie founded his house in the same city, with a first sale that December. Buyers paid nothing extra until 1975, when Christie's first charged a premium of 10 per cent and, in the words of the economists Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy, "Sotheby's immediately followed suit." The matching was noticed. In 1981, The Art Newspaper recalls, the British Antique Dealers' Association and the Society of London Art Dealers "had prepared a legal action" contending that the two houses "had colluded to introduce the buyer's premium at the same moment." The suspicion is older than the scandal.

The next change was ownership. In 1983 the shopping-mall developer A. Alfred Taubman bought Sotheby's as a white knight, heading off a hostile takeover by Marshall Cogan and Stephen Swid of General Felt; the art-market journalist Judd Tully, in his obituary of Taubman, puts the price at "just under $125 million", with Henry Ford II among the backers. Taubman floated the company on the New York Stock Exchange in 1988 under the ticker BID, which made its profits public. In 1989, Tully notes, Sotheby's auction sales came to $2.9 billion against Christie's $2.1 billion.

The crash that made zero a price

The market collapsed at the start of the 1990s, and the two houses went after consignments with every lever they controlled. According to Ashenfelter and Graddy's paper, "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy" (Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2005), they cut sellers' commissions drastically — "in many cases to zero" — extended non-recourse loans, and donated to a seller's favourite charity if a lot sold above an agreed price. A non-recourse loan can be repaid only out of the pledged property, so a seller whose lot fails owes nothing more; the house has, in effect, underwritten the sale. The squeeze showed in the accounts. Sotheby's net profit fell from $113 million in 1989 to $3.9 million in 1991.

The leverage lay with the sellers because there was almost nowhere else for them to go. CBS News reported at Taubman's sentencing that the two houses "control more than 90 percent of the world's art auctions." A consignor with a major collection could take one house's terms to the other, and each concession set the floor for the next. Ending the slide meant ending that: the two houses had to stop being each other's alternative.

Twelve meetings and a parking lot

The first meetings were between the chairmen. Sir Anthony Tennant of Christie's and Taubman of Sotheby's "had breakfast meetings at Taubman's London flat", Ashenfelter and Graddy write, and at his New York residence. "Evidence from the trial showed that they met on 12 occasions."

Christopher Mason's book on the case, The Art of the Steal, supplies the menu and the pitch. In Mason's account, as Knowledge at Wharton's 2004 review tells it, the two chairmen meet at Taubman's pied-à-terre in London over "a breakfast of scrambled eggs and smoked salmon". Tennant complains that waiving commissions to win major consignments is hurting the profits of both firms, and works out what it would be worth if they agreed not to negotiate the seller's commission: "an extra $12 million-$15 million a year for Christie's and $18 million for Sotheby's." The two chairmen then tell their chief executives — Christopher Davidge of Christie's and Diana "Dede" Brooks of Sotheby's — to "work out the details". Mason notes that Taubman denies it.

The chief executives did. In the paper's words, "on one important occasion, in which the exact details of the price-fixing agreement were agreed between the two, Davidge took the Concorde" to New York. They sat in the parking lot for two hours in Brooks's car, the paper says, until Davidge caught the 12:30pm Concorde back to London.

Sotheby's first visible change went the other way. In 1994, after several meetings with Davidge, it abandoned the practice of offering interest-free advances and of donating to charities to win business. A house gives up its sweeteners only if it trusts that its rival has given up its own too.

The scale sellers could see

In March 1995 Christie's announced "a fixed non-negotiable sliding-scale commission on the sales price", effective 1 September. On 13 April Sotheby's announced its own new sellers' rates, similar in shape and effective 5 September, with lower charges for museums. Ashenfelter and Graddy print Christie's scale as their Table 1, reproduced below.

Christie's seller's commission scale, effective 1 September 1995, as reproduced in Table 1 of Ashenfelter and Graddy's paper.
Annual sales achievedCommission (% of final bid price)
Up to $99,999"As now": 10% for most consignments, with existing higher rates kept for lots selling for less than $75,000
$100,000–$249,9999%
$250,000–$499,9998%
$500,000–$999,9996%
$1,000,000–$2,499,9995%
$2,500,000–$4,999,9994%
$5,000,000 and above2%

The first column's heading, "Annual sales achieved", suggests that the rate fell as a seller's yearly volume with the house rose. The paper does not say whether each rate applied to the whole price or only to the slice inside a band, so the scale can't be turned into a dollar fee here. Its shape is plain, though: the biggest consignors, the ones who had been bargaining commissions down to nothing, would now pay at least 2 per cent, and nobody could bargain.

A rate card makes ideal cover. Two houses publishing similar schedules look, from outside, like two firms that have each read the same market, and the agreement behind the matching is invisible. The indictment filed on 2 May 2001 in United States v. Taubman and Tennant sets out what the Justice Department said lay behind it. It alleges a conspiracy running from at least February 1993 to at least December 1999 in which the conspirators discussed commission rates, agreed to raise prices by fixing sellers' commission rates, agreed to publish non-negotiable schedules, agreed the order in which each house would publish them, issued consistent schedules, and exchanged customer information to monitor and enforce adherence. That is an allegation, not a finding, though a jury later convicted Taubman of the conspiracy it describes. The 1995 sequence is consistent with it: Christie's announced first, in March, and Sotheby's followed on 13 April.

The matching was also what gave the game away. In June 1996 Britain's Office of Fair Trading announced informal inquiries into possible anti-competitive practices, and Ashenfelter and Graddy say the authorities "were concerned with the identical and non-negotiable commission rates".

What the fix was worth

No single number captures it, because the sources measure different things. Ashenfelter and Graddy call Brooks "remarkably candid about her role in the fixing of sellers' commissions", and she put the gain to Sotheby's at "some $10 to $15 million per year." If Christie's gained the same, they calculate, "total profits would be on the order of $20 to $30 million per year" — $100 million to $150 million over a five-year conspiracy. At Taubman's sentencing, CBS reported, he was punished "for overcharging Sotheby's sellers $43.8 million over six years". Court documents cited when Brooks was sentenced put Sotheby's own seller's commissions between April 1993 and February 2000 at more than $225 million, and the indictment puts the two houses' US seller-commission revenues over its period at no less than $400 million.

Extra profit, overcharge and revenue are different yardsticks, and they do not reconcile: run over five years, Brooks's own range comes to $50 million–$75 million for Sotheby's alone, above the $43.8 million prosecutors cited. None of them prices what the sellers who negotiated nothing would have paid in a competitive market, which is the question the civil case had to answer.

How it came apart

The cartel outlived its first investigators. After the Office of Fair Trading's inquiries, the Justice Department issued subpoenas in May 1997, demanding documents created since 1992. "For a while, it looked as if the investigations would fizzle."

The sources then disagree about how the end came. Ashenfelter and Graddy have Christie's lawyers, "in preparation for the government investigation", beginning to uncover evidence of a conspiracy in late 1999, as Davidge was being replaced as chief executive; Christie's received amnesty in January 2000, "conditional on Christie's cooperation with the Justice Department's inquiry". Wharton's review of Mason's book puts Davidge's fall earlier. Christie's "acquired a new majority owner in 1998", and Davidge — a 34-year veteran, ten of them as chief executive — was fired, having kept "voluminous notes" that his lawyers believed he could use to bargain with US prosecutors. Christie's did change hands around then: in May 1998 François Pinault's holding company, Artémis, bought 29.1 per cent of it for about $243.2 million and later bought the rest, in a deal that valued the whole company at $1.2 billion. Whichever account is right, it ends the same way, with Christie's cooperating and Sotheby's exposed.

At Sotheby's the break came in February 2000, when Taubman and Brooks stepped down. On 5 October 2000 Brooks pleaded guilty to one felony count of price-fixing and agreed to testify against Taubman.

Who paid, and who did not

The indictment of Taubman and Tennant came on 2 May 2001. That September Sotheby's agreed to plead guilty to conspiring with Christie's to fix sellers' commissions and to pay a fine of $45 million over five years, while maintaining its innocence on buyers' premiums. Taubman went to trial and denied the charges. On 5 December 2001 the jury convicted him after deliberating, the Associated Press reported, for "less than two days". His lawyer Robert Fiske said: "We were, of course, disappointed in the verdict."

Judge George Daniels sentenced him on Monday 22 April 2002 to a year in prison and a $7.5 million fine. Prosecutors had asked for three years. His lawyers had asked for probation, citing a stroke, heart ailments and his charitable giving, and blamed Brooks, saying she had run Sotheby's without consulting him or the board, CNN reported. Daniels was unmoved. "Regardless of what height we may attain in life, no one is above the law," he said, and: "Price-fixing is a crime whether it is committed in a local grocery store or the halls of a great auction house." He faulted Taubman, who was 78, for portraying himself as the victim of a "vicious scheme" by subordinates who later turned on him, and said: "There is a lack of contrition demonstrated here."

Taubman was ordered to report to prison on 1 August. His sentence of a year and a day was cut by 54 days for good behaviour, Ashenfelter and Graddy note; Tully writes that he served it at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, and he was released in 2003. Wikipedia records that he continued to insist he was innocent.

Brooks, the first woman to head a major auction house, was sentenced a week later, Antiques and the Arts Weekly reported. Ashenfelter and Graddy record three years' probation, including six months' home detention, 1,000 hours of community service and a $350,000 fine. Daniels called her decision to cooperate "self-serving", telling her: "Although your decision to cooperate was the right one, it was not a noble gesture motivated by a guilty conscience." She apologised, in a shaky voice, to "all the people I've hurt."

Tennant never stood trial. Living in England, he refused to come to the United States to face trial and, CBS noted, could not be extradited on antitrust charges. Christie's, with its amnesty, escaped the criminal case and paid its half of the civil one.

The settlement that paid the wrong people

The civil case was bigger than the criminal one. In April 2000 Judge Lewis A. Kaplan agreed to class-action status for the suits, then did something unusual: he announced that lead counsel would be decided by auction. Firms named the minimum sum they expected to win for the class, and the highest bidder would receive 25 per cent of any recovery above its own number. Boies, Schiller & Flexner won, with a bid that Ashenfelter and Graddy, citing a 2002 study, say was "more than twice that of the next highest bid". In September 2001 each house agreed to pay $256 million — $512 million between them. "A settlement of $512 million in these circumstances is eminently reasonable by any standard," Kaplan ruled. Lead counsel received $26.75 million, about 5 per cent of the recovery.

The court's plan of allocation spread the net fund among class members pro rata. It estimated sellers' overcharges at "1 percent of the hammer price" and buyers' at 5 per cent of the hammer price up to $50,000, with $2,500 for buyers above that.

Ashenfelter and Graddy think the split was backwards. Their argument rests on the standard private-value model of an auction. Each bidder has a fixed value for the work; when a buyer's premium is added, each lowers his bid by the premium, so the hammer price falls by the same amount and the seller bears the cost. They conclude that "to first order, buyers deserve no compensation due to increased commissions". The evidence they cite is Ashenfelter's own 1989 study of wine auctions: while Christie's charged no buyer's premium, its hammer prices ran about 12 per cent above Sotheby's, and the gap disappeared once it adopted one. Reserve prices, who chooses to bid and common-value effects could change the picture, the authors concede, but they call those second-order for most bidders.

The verdict on the settlement is blunt. They write that "in this case the split up of the civil settlement between buyers and sellers was grossly misguided." Buyers "ended up with the great proportion of the settlement", and in a footnote they say "the sellers should have ended up with the bulk of the compensation."

The authors write as economists, and the court looked at the same case and approved the settlement, so this is an argument about what the money should have followed, not a finding that it was paid wrongly. It is still a striking result: the one party the criminal case had clearly identified as overcharged was not the one the settlement mostly paid.

Where seller fees stand now

The concessions the 1995 scales were built to end came back. In 2019 the critic Lee Rosenbaum described the two houses as "foregoing commissions from some sellers and even forking over to some sellers a portion of the fee charged to buyers", and warned that their rivalry "may devolve into a race to the bottom". She saw no private remedy: "These archrivals can't mutually forge an agreement to stop the carnage: That would invite charges of price-fixing." The only cleanup, she wrote, "would be government regulation."

When Sotheby's announced a fee overhaul in 2024, The Art Newspaper noted that sellers of higher-value works had "grown accustomed to owing little, if any, commission to Sotheby's in recent years". The overhaul was an attempt to replace bespoke terms with a published schedule. From the spring, buyers would pay 20 per cent up to $6 million and 10 per cent above; sellers of lots with a low estimate of $5 million or less would pay 10 per cent of the hammer price, capped at $50,000 a work; and lots above that estimate would carry no seller's commission at all.

It lasted less than a year. On 19 December 2024 Sotheby's announced a reversal: from 17 February 2025 buyer's premiums would return to roughly their earlier levels — 27 per cent up to $1 million, 22 per cent from $1 million to $8 million and 15 per cent above — and seller fees would revert to "bespoke terms", negotiated individually. The Art Newspaper reported that the streamlined 10 per cent fee "proved less attractive to potential sellers", and quoted chief executive Charles Stewart: "the market doubled down on the status quo."

The two episodes are mirror images. In 1995 two rivals agreed on a published, non-negotiable scale and, the indictment alleges, policed it by trading customer information. In 2024 one house tried a published scale alone, and by Sotheby's own account sellers found it less attractive than bespoke terms. What a seller pays either house today is still a private contract. What the catalogue prints is the buyer's premium, which Sotheby's reset again on 13 February 2026 and which our guide to the November 2026 New York sales works through lot by lot. The owners have changed, too: Sotheby's has been private since Patrick Drahi bought it in 2019 for $3.7 billion, and in May 2026 Reuters described Christie's as owned by the Pinault family's investment holding, Artémis, as it reported François-Henri Pinault's appointment as chairman.

The bottom line

Sotheby's and Christie's do compete — for estates, for headline lots, for the next great collection — but for six years in the 1990s they agreed not to compete on what it costs to sell. The price of that agreement was a corporate guilty plea, a prison term for a chairman, home detention for a chief executive and $512 million in settlements that, on the economists' reading, mostly paid the side of the hammer the fix had not touched. The seller's commission is negotiable again, sometimes down to nothing, and the rivals know the risk of agreeing otherwise: in Lee Rosenbaum's words, it "would invite charges of price-fixing."

FAQ

What exactly did Sotheby's and Christie's fix?

The seller's commission — the percentage a consignor pays the house to sell a work. The indictment alleges a conspiracy from at least February 1993 to at least December 1999 to fix sellers' commission rates, publish non-negotiable schedules in an agreed order and exchange customer information to police them. Sotheby's agreed to plead guilty to fixing sellers' commissions but maintained its innocence on buyers' premiums, the fee the catalogue prints.

Who was punished, and why did Christie's escape?

Sotheby's agreed to a $45 million fine. Diana Brooks, its chief executive, pleaded guilty and received three years' probation including six months' home detention. Alfred Taubman, its chairman, was convicted on 5 December 2001 and sentenced on 22 April 2002 to a year in prison and a $7.5 million fine.

Christie's received amnesty in January 2000, conditional on cooperating with the Justice Department. Its former chairman, Sir Anthony Tennant, was indicted but never tried: he stayed in England, and CBS noted he could not be extradited on antitrust charges. Both houses still paid $256 million each in the civil settlement.

Is it illegal for two auction houses to charge similar fees?

Similar prices alone are not what the case turned on. It turned on evidence of agreement: the chairmen's breakfasts, the chief executives' two hours in a parked car, and the indictment's allegations about the order of publication and the exchange of customer information. Lee Rosenbaum wrote in 2019 that even an agreement between the houses to stop escalating their concessions to sellers "would invite charges of price-fixing." This describes the case; it isn't legal advice.

Who actually got the $512 million?

Each house paid $256 million. Under the court's plan of allocation the net fund was split pro rata among class members, on the assumption that sellers had been overcharged 1 per cent of the hammer price and buyers 5 per cent of the hammer price up to $50,000, plus $2,500 above that. Lead counsel, Boies, Schiller & Flexner, received $26.75 million.

Economists Orley Ashenfelter and Kathryn Graddy argue that buyers "ended up with the great proportion of the settlement" even though sellers bore the cost, and call the split "grossly misguided". The court approved the settlement; their argument is about what it should have done.

What do sellers pay at Sotheby's and Christie's now?

It depends on the lot. At Sotheby's, seller fees returned to "bespoke terms", negotiated individually, from 17 February 2025, after a 2024 experiment with a standard 10 per cent fee (capped at $50,000 a work, and nothing above a $5 million low estimate) proved less attractive to sellers. Reporting in 2019 and 2024 describes major consignors paying little or no commission, and sometimes receiving a share of the buyer's premium.

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